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Samuel Tofte 
The Politics of a Gesture:  The Impact of Nixon’s Visit to China on Nixon’s 
Presidency 
 The importance of a symbolic gesture in diplomacy is very difficult to gauge.  Diplomats 
often embark on social functions, meetings and trips to international countries in order to make 
contact with foreign diplomats and build relationships with governments.  This is an effective 
means of forging political relationships, but how important is it when it comes to international 
policy and treaty negotiation?  In short, it is extremely important in the process of policy-making, 
even without the tangible evidence showing its significance.  Establishing contact can be the 
most difficult and arduous step in the road to good diplomatic relations, a fact that President 
Richard Nixon found out in his attempt at rapprochement with China.  A gesture such as Nixon’s 
trip to China also carries with it a fair amount of good political publicity, and Nixon and 
Chairman Mao Zedong of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were well aware of this.  The 
effect of the trip is evident in the public opinion at the time.  Nixon gained a lot of support for the 
trip with a presidential election right around the corner.  Political motivations were at play in 
foreign relations as well, as both China and the U.S. did not want to see the other becoming too 
friendly with the Soviet Union.
1
  By establishing contact with China, and ultimately making his 
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historic trip to Beijing, Nixon was able to complete one of the most significant symbolic gestures 
in 20
th
 century diplomacy. What were his actual primary motivations?  Nixon, although he 
demonstrated a degree of belief in the improvement of Sino-American relations as an instrument 
of peace, primarily sought rapprochement with China due to political motivations during a period 
of waning support domestically and internationally.  
The conflict between capitalism and communism controlled the political landscape in the 
20
th
 century.  Led by the U.S., the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it 
was an issue that dominated the international and domestic scene.  Wars were fought, such as the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars, throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s as a result of the pressure applied 
by both sides.  In the Korean War specifically, Chinese and Americans were engaged in battle, 
caught between the “civil war” of North Korea and South Korea.
2
  In the U.S., fear of war with 
mainland China was substantial in the 1950’s as a result of the Korean War, clashes over 
Taiwan, and the rhetoric coming out of both governments.  Rapprochement with China was not 
feasible in this volatile atmosphere, and it did not become an option until late in the 1960’s, 
when Nixon took office and Mao brought China out of the Cultural Revolution and out of 
isolation. 
Mao grew up in the small village of Shaoshan in the Hunan province during the last gasp 
of the Qing dynasty.  It was a constant struggle for Mao to continue his education, as both money 
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and pressures at home pushed him toward the family profession of farming.
 3
  His education on a 
wide variety of literature, covering everything from traditional Chinese literature to books on 
modern western science, was crucial in Mao’s philosophical development.
4
  Mao’s childhood  
was a difficult time of transition in China as foreign incursion from Japan and the West, coupled 
with the ineffectiveness of Qing leadership, laid the groundwork for Mao and many of those in 
his generation to look increasingly at alternative and revolutionary solutions to the injustice 
brought against China. 
By 1949, the Chinese Communist Party had driven Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Guomindang to Taiwan and established the People’s Republic of China.  Without trying to over-
simplify the complex nature of Chinese history during Mao’s leadership, China went through a 
difficult time of social and economic upheaval.  Mao preached world revolution for the people of 
different countries, positioning himself as the anti-imperial and a revolutionary leader.  He was 
anti-American, but more specifically, anti-American government.  He believed revolution was 
imminent for the people of America, thus much of his negative rhetoric was aimed toward the 
American government.   
Domestically, there were two major policies he attempted to put in place, with terrible 
consequences for the Chinese people.  In 1958 he proposed the Great Leap Forward, a radical 
attempt to move China towards industrialization.  The Great Leap Forward failed, leading to 
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famine until 1961, with huge casualties.
5
  The major social change that Mao attempted was 
deemed the Cultural Revolution, beginning in 1966.  The Cultural Revolution was characterized 
by Mao-approved mass chaos led by his “shock troops” the Red Guard.
6
  Student demonstrations 
and riots filled the cities to root out the adversaries of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and 
expose Mao’s enemies within the communist ranks.  It was a time of international isolation for 
China as it turned inward causing social upheaval.  It was also a brand of isolation that had to 
end in order for rapprochement between the United States and China to come about.  On the eve 
of Nixon’s first term, that isolation ended.   
Nixon is often characterized as a villain in popular media and culture; a representation of 
corruption in politics.  One must look no further than the movie, Frost/Nixon (2008), to see the 
disapproving image of Nixon that still thrives in American culture.  The Watergate scandal in 
1974, for obvious reasons, was a huge blow to Nixon’s legacy.  For many Americans, that is 
Nixon’s legacy.  The terms ‘secretive’ and ‘brooding’ can be used to describe the common 
portrayal of Nixon, and these descriptions are not entirely unfounded.  Nixon, by all accounts, 
was a very secretive man.
7
  Through all of this perceived villainy, however, this was a man who 
was popular enough to be elected to several different political offices, culminating in the 
presidential election in 1968.   
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 Nixon was a prominent lawyer and member of the Republican Party leading up to the 
election of 1968, and was seen as a counter-balance to President Lyndon B. Johnson.  Where 
Johnson was a stark supporter of the civil rights’ movement, Nixon saw it with a lesser degree of 
importance in light of the turmoil elsewhere in America, and indeed the world.  With Vietnam, 
Nixon criticized Johnson’s indecisiveness and called for a stronger war effort and policy.  
Johnson wanted to contain the war in South Vietnam, whereas Nixon favored extending the war 
to North Vietnam.
8
   
Nixon, following the Republican Party platform, was viewed as a leader of the 
conservatives, as was seen with the aforementioned issues.  He also made no inclination toward 
normalizing relations with the PRC, or even recognizing the legitimacy of their government.  “It 
would be disastrous to the cause of freedom for the U.S. to recognize Red China or accept its 
admission in the United Nations.”
9
  This was Nixon’s stance just eight years prior to his historic 
trip to China; a stance that conservative Republicans would remind Nixon of once he made clear 
his intention to visit Mao.  Nixon’s social predisposition also showed his conservative nature 
through his dislike of the 1960’s American counter culture.
10
 
Nixon was a major conservative voice in America during the majority of the 1960’s—
there was a period early in the 1960’s in which he felt his political career was through—but his 
main political interest resided in foreign policy.  Historians note his admiration for strong heads 
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of state like Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle.
11
  He was also a President in the mold of 
Woodrow Wilson, a man who felt that the president should be the chief foreign policy maker.  “I 
have always thought this country could run itself domestically without a President…You need a 
President for foreign policy; no Secretary of State is really important.”
12
  Nixon’s reasoning for 
this was due in part to his secret and paranoid nature, evident in the seemingly endless hours of 
conversations that he recorded.  He did not trust the U.S. State Department, often to the lament 
of the Secretary of State of Nixon’s first term, William Rogers.  This mistrust stemmed mainly 
from Nixon’s fear of leaked information within the government.  With fewer people being 
informed about a particular subject or issue, the chances of information being leaked to the 
media were greatly reduced.  
Nixon was not alone in his construction of U.S. foreign policy, as he relied heavily on his 
National Security Aide, Henry Kissinger.  Kissinger was a very intelligent man who Nixon 
depended upon to act as an extension of himself when dealing with both domestic and 
international issues.  Kissinger arrived in Beijing in 1971 on a secret mission in order to set-up 
the historic trip and hash out the issues with Zhou.
13
  This showed the extent of trust that Nixon 
had in Kissinger to get the job done in foreign policy.  Nixon’s paranoia over the State 
Department was embodied by Kissinger, who was often at odds with Rogers.  There was also 
friction between Nixon and Kissinger.  “Ford has just got to realize,” Nixon candidly said, “there 
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are times when Henry has to be kicked in the nuts.  Because sometimes Henry starts to think he’s 
president.  But at other times you have to pet Henry and treat him like a child.”
14
  Kissinger is 
quoted throughout his memoirs giving similarly ill-mannered comments about Nixon.  The 
friction between Nixon and Kissinger paled in comparison to Nixon’s rapport with the United 
States media.   
The relationship between Nixon and the media was naturally a poor one.  Nixon, being 
the secretive man that he was, had no inclination of giving the media any information that was 
beyond necessary.  Likewise, the media was in its investigative golden age with the likes of Tom 
Brokaw and Walter Cronkite in their journalistic prime.  Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of 
the Washington Post were about to solidify their place in journalism history by breaking the 
Watergate scandal at the expense of Nixon’s legacy and presidency.  With the trip to China, 
however, there was an opportunity for mutual benefit for both Nixon and the media to work 
together.  There was a clear emphasis on symbolism as a major proponent of this trip and Nixon 
needed the media in order to convey the trip to the American people. 
The group of journalists sent over by Nixon to cover the trip was some of the only people 
who actually saw Nixon, and his group, touch down in Beijing on February 21
st
, 1972.  The 
Chinese government wanted to send a message to the Americans, telling their citizens to 
disregard Nixon’s motorcade as it made its way through Beijing that afternoon.
15
  When Nixon 
                                                             
14 Robert Dallek, “Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power,” American Historical Review 113 (2008): 226. 
15 MacMillan, Nixon and Mao, 22. 
 
 
exited the plane, he shook hands with Zhou.  This was one of the most important events of the 
trip because in 1954, secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, pointedly refused to shake Zhou’s 
hand during a peace conference.
16
  Almost immediately, an invigorated Mao—who nearly died 
from pneumonia just weeks prior—agreed to meet Nixon on the first day.  The meeting consisted 
of Mao, Nixon, Zhou, Kissinger, Kissinger’s aide Winston Lord, and Mao’s interpreter, Tang 
Wensheng.
17
  The meeting did not provide any tangible conversation toward diplomacy between 
the countries, as the two leaders chose to work around the major issues between them.  The 
meeting always had more importance put upon it than anything that Nixon and Mao would 
discuss during it.  It was a truly historic event and many have argued that it altered the landscape 
of the Cold War.  This would be Nixon’s only meeting with Mao during this trip. 
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During his week in China, Nixon visited Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai in that order.  
On his first night, he attended a banquet organized by Premier Zhou Enlai; it was broadcast live 
to the U.S.
18
  The banquet was an important part of diplomacy and of Chinese culture.  It is 
difficult to find reactions 
to the viewing of this 
banquet broadcast, but it 
projected a positive 
image to televisions 
across America.  During 
the rest of the week, 
Nixon visited various 
historic sites like the 
Great Wall and the Ming 
tombs, but he was mainly 
busy in meetings with 
Zhou and Kissinger trying to hash out what would become known as the Shanghai 
Communiqué.
19
  He left his wife, Pat Nixon, in charge of handling the bulk of personal 
appearances during the trip.   
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The joint communiqué, deemed the Shanghai Communiqué, was the statement made 
toward the end of the trip in which both countries essentially stated their position going forward: 
There are essential differences between China and the United States in their 
social systems and foreign policies.  However, the two sides agreed that 
countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the 
principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, 
nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other 
states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”
20
 
This statement is a clear move towards the thawing of relations between the two countries and a 
hope that they can work together in the future despite the fundamental differences between the 
societies.  There were a few rough areas in the negotiations over what would be included in the 
communiqué, the main problem residing over Taiwan.  The Chinese reiterated that Taiwan was 
the “crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations.”
21
  The U.S. declared its position 
favoring a peaceable settlement of the “Two China” issue.  The major reason that this 
communiqué was brought to completion in time for the conclusion of the trip was the shrewd 
negotiations and wording of the document by Zhou and Kissinger, the main architects of the 
statement.  With a successful joint statement by the two countries, the trip achieved its purpose 
without any setbacks that were feared by both parties prior to the trip. 
 The media’s coverage of the trip was essential to the overall success.  Nixon needed a 
steady flow of press bombarding televisions and newspapers in the U.S. in order for the symbolic 
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aspect of the trip to have its effect, and it was clear that symbolism was Nixon’s major goal.  “As 
we have said many times—and so has Mr. Nixon—the purpose of the visit is mainly symbolic.  
It reflects China’s apparent desire to show its sincerity but promises nothing in substantive 
results.”
22
  Nixon had an upcoming election and his approval ratings were slipping as 1971 came 
to a close.  With the media and the timing of the trip, Nixon had an opportunity to make huge 
gains in popularity with a successful diplomatic trip to China.  Because of this, it can be argued 
that the overwhelming positive support Nixon received was the most important outcome of the 
trip for Nixon’s presidency and his impending campaign for a second term. 
At the beginning of 1972, public approval was waning in regard to Nixon’s handling of 
the Soviet Union and China, along with his overall approval rating.  Through most of 1971, his 
overall approval rating was below 50%, and at the beginning of 1972, it was at a middling 
49%.
23
  Pertaining to China specifically, a poll by the Chicago Tribune in January 1972 showed 
that 43 percent of those polled felt negatively about how he handled China, while 39 percent felt 
positive.  Those numbers were drastically down from September 1971, when the approval ratings 
were 46 percent positive and 36 percent negative.
24
  A portion of this drop can be attributed to 
the India-Pakistan war as well as the ongoing struggle in Vietnam, but the public was becoming 
increasingly wary over the few developments made with the communist powers.   
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 On the eve of Nixon’s trip, however, public opinion in these areas rose once more to a 
very optimistic level.  Nixon’s overall approval rating soared to 55 percent, his highest rating in 
nearly two years.  Louis Harris, writer for the Chicago Tribune, noted that “it is unusual, short of 
a national emergency, for an incumbent President to regain the higher levels of public support he 
tends to achieve in the earlier months of his administration.”
25
  His approval ratings in dealing 
with China were also up to 44 percent positive and down to 34 percent negative, almost a 
complete reversal of the numbers from just a month prior.  Nixon’s only poor approval rating in 
the eyes of the public pertained to the war in Vietnam.   
The American people were also warming up to the Chinese people themselves as a result 
of Nixon’s visit.  In a Gallup poll in the New York Times conducted after the trip, 68 percent of 
those polled believed that it would have some degree of effectiveness in influencing world 
peace.
26
  68 was the same percent of Americans who “gave their blessing” to the trip in another 
Harris poll published in the fall of 1971.
27
  The Gallup poll also compared results to a poll taken 
in the mid-1960’s about the public’s views on the Chinese people.  The Gallup organization gave 
a list of 23 positive and negative terms to choose from for the people polled to describe how they 
viewed the Chinese people.  In 1966, “ignorant,” “sly,” and “treacherous” were among the most 
chosen terms, as negative terms outweighed positive terms by a ratio of eight to five.  A week 
after the trip, however, positive terms were atop the poll at a ratio of 3 to 1, including the top 
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words “intelligent,” “artistic,” and “progressive.”
28
  It was clear that Nixon was receiving a huge 
boost in the polls at a very important time, the year of the 1972 election.  It is amazing, the 
impact that a week of news coverage and the opening of dialogue can have on groups that know 
very little about one another. 
The various polls taken before and after the trip give a good barometer of the overall 
views that the American people had on the trip, but a simple overarching percentage of approval 
and disapproval is not enough to see into the domestic outlook on Nixon’s trip.  Individual and 
editorial opinions are also essential in order to understand specific concerns and viewpoints.  A 
presidential approval rating of 55 percent was strong, especially in such a divided period in 
American history.  Even with that rating, however, this means that 45 percent of Americans did 
not give their approval to Nixon, and yet many times, this minority of dissenting voices was 
buried.   
 When Nixon announced he would be making a trip to China, there were obvious 
questions raised.  Many of those questions revolved around the Taiwan issue.  As the PRC 
continued to effectively control mainland China, Chi’ang Kai-shek and the Nationalist 
government’s claim of control over the Chinese people as a whole was losing its luster on the 
international scene.  The biggest worry for many Americans was concern over abandonment of 
Taiwan.  The Chinese Nationalists were already facing removal from a United Nations in 1971 
that was increasingly favorable of the PRC holding the China seat.  A U.S. driven movement for 
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a seat for both Chinas left the U.N. split on the issue, slightly leaning toward one seat for the 
PRC.
29
  In a particularly outspoken manner, the former president of the A.F.L-C.I.O, George 
Meany, made the comparison between the President’s new policy toward China and “the League 
of Nation’s consent in 1935 to the ‘rape of Ethiopia’ and former British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain’s concessions to Germany in the Munich Pact of 1938.”
30
  Labor unions and 
liberals were afraid of America pulling support for Taiwan, but for many of them, rapprochement 
with mainland China was difficult to rail against. 
The most outspoken opponents of Nixon’s trip to China were not his Democrat rivals, but 
conservative Republicans that gladly threw their support behind him as the warrior against anti-
communism in the past.  It was a huge shift from Nixon’s previous stance on communism and 
Republicans were not inclined to let him forget that.  Accusations of Democrats being soft on 
communism were an important aspect of Republican campaign strategy throughout the 1950’s 
and 1960’s and many feared that Nixon tarnished that strategy overnight by announcing his trip 
to China. 
Their criticism takes various forms, but the most anguished and spontaneous 
complaint is expressed by Human Events, the blunt, but candid, voice of the 
G.O.P. right wing…‘In view of the debacle that occurred at the United Nations, 
the Republican Party has probably lost forever one of its favorite campaign 
issues:  accusing the Democrats of being soft on Red China.  The issue is now 
dead.’
31
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This is the most common complaint among the right wing of the Republican Party and it was an 
understandable fear from a political standpoint.  While Nixon was chiefly concerned with his 
own reelection in 1972, the Republicans still had to focus on congressional elections as well.  
The leader of the Republican Party turning away from a huge piece of the party platform creates 
ammunition for the opposition on the eve of major campaigning.   
 William Loeb, former editor of the conservative New Hampshire newspaper The 
Manchester Union Leader, was an adamant supporter of Nixon until his announcement to visit 
China.  Loeb was a major conservative voice at the time, although many considered him to have 
an extreme viewpoint on many issues.  Loeb was a “journalist” in a very loose sense of the word, 
often resorting to name-calling in order to reinforce his point of view.  Pertaining to Nixon’s visit 
to China, Loeb deemed the trip “immoral, indecent, insane, and fraught with danger” and said 
that Nixon was “too left-wing” now.
32
  This is obviously an extreme view and one that is in the 
minority, but it shows the fear brewing among ultra-conservatives due to the trip.  It shows an 
interesting insight that even though the times were changing in regards to politics between the 
U.S. and the communist superpowers, there was still substantial anxiety over communism with 
the lingering Red Scare effect. 
 While it may have been difficult for Nixon to face opposition from those he considered 
political allies, it was really the only dissent he faced domestically.  It was also opposition 
subdued by other worries inside the Republican party.  Newspaper reports in 1971 indicate that 
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the G.O.P. had bigger issues on their plate than Nixon’s trip to China.  Poor economic policies 
led to fears that businesses, which has always been an ally to the Republicans, could be waning 
in support.
33
  A symbolic trip to China was simply not high up on the list of worries for a party 
facing losses in the upcoming election. 
 The overwhelming support from the American public as the trip inched closer also helped 
quell opposing voices.  Shown earlier, the approval ratings were on the rise as a result of the new 
policies toward the communist powers, and individual opinions supported those approval 
numbers in the majority of the newspaper articles in the build up to the trip.  The term “political 
coup” is thrown around in several articles, even as a concession by those who do not approve of 
the trip.
34
 
 In the “Harris Survey” in the Chicago Tribune, an interesting notion was raised involving 
the American peoples’ willingness to deal with communist powers that were previously feared.  
The effect of the Vietnam War and other conflicts with communism wore down the American 
people, and it led to a new sense of compromise and peace by diplomacy.
35
  This trip would have 
been wholly rejected by the American public 10 years prior, but it had become apparent that war 
with the communist powers was not the answer to the problem.   
 Editorial opinions shared the same cautious optimism that the polling indicated as well.  
The Charlotte, North Carolina newspaper, The News, showed its support pointing out that the 
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“risks are well worth taking” even if minimal gains are achieved.  The State Journal of Topeka, 
Kansas, went as far as to claim that the trip could be a “turning point in world peace.”  The 
Philadelphia Inquirer echoed the hopes of many Americans that Nixon’s trip will breed a 
“common ground” in the search for peace between the world’s superpowers.  This trip was 
accepted in all different regions and groups across America, and it was supported by the 
collection of editorials showing varying degrees of approval and optimism.
36
 
 Statements made in Congress by Democrats, showed optimism for the trip as well.  
Democratic Senator Robert Byrd recognized the importance of the trip for establishing relations 
and for securing the “future security of the United States and the world.”
37
  Upon Nixon’s 
announcement of the trip, Democratic leader Mike Mansfield was quoted as being 
“flabbergasted, delighted, and happy” about the proposed trip.
38
  It is a rare occurrence in such a 
politically divided period for a president like Nixon to earn such strong support from the 
opposing political party.   
 While Nixon was no doubt pleased with the domestic support he garnered for his trip in 
1971, the level of importance he placed upon foreign policy also created a level of importance 
for the international opinion of the trip.  International support for the trip was much more mixed 
than on the home front.   
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American allies in the Pacific were worried as to what effect American rapprochement 
with the PRC would have on the power dynamic in the Pacific.  Some Australians echoed the 
concerns in the Pacific as to the future of the region.  “The [Australian] conservatives argue that 
the U.S. is not only an unreliable ally but also an ‘unpredictable one.’”
39
  Although this was a 
period of diminishing U.S. power, many countries still followed the lead of the U.S. in order to 
determine what future international diplomacy would hold.  This is a valid concern of non-
communist Pacific allies, because for many of them, the U.S. was their biggest communist 
deterrent.  Japan had similar concerns over this new U.S. foreign policy.  Former ambassador to 
Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer noted to a U.S. House of Representatives committee that the U.S. 
actions with China was a complete departure from “Dulles-style inflexibility” but that it was so 
unpredictable that it was “possibly a sign of emotional instability on our part.”
40
   
The Soviet Union was very uneasy over the visit to China, as Sino-Soviet relations had 
deteriorated dramatically since the PRC took control of the government.  The Soviets and the 
PRC differed on the details of the correct way to follow Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and war 
became a possibility between the bordering nations.  Rapprochement between China and the U.S. 
was a threat to Soviet power and they believed it would tilt the balance of power in favor of the 
Chinese in the Pacific region.  It was this Sino-Soviet dispute that actually created the urgency 
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toward improved Sino-American relations.
41
  While the Soviets were understandably 
uncomfortable over Sino-American cooperation, they were not the most outraged group on the 
world scene.   
Taiwan expressed nothing short of disgust over the proposed visit, and for good reason; 
Taiwan was essentially being abandoned by its strongest and most influential ally in the 
international scene.  One historian contended that Nixon was so ambitious toward Sino-
American rapprochement that he gave up far too much to achieve it.
42
  This includes the 
traditional American stance on Taiwan. 
Despite Nixon’s assurances that the U.S. would not turn its back on the Republic of 
China, Taiwan made its opinion known.  After Nixon made his announcement of the trip, Taiwan 
expressed an “overwhelming frustration” to their ally’s new found interest in improved relations 
with the PRC.  They had to balance their negative opinion on the trip with the reality that they 
still depended on the U.S. for aide.
43
 
After Nixon’s trip and the joint communiqué was issued, Taiwan did not back down from 
their disapproval of the trip.  An anonymous high-ranking member of the Nationalist party said 
“People here have had great faith in the leadership of the United States up to now, but the 
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confidence of the people of the whole Western Pacific will now change.”
44
  The Nationalist Party 
itself issued a statement shortly thereafter condemning any agreement “involving the rights and 
interests of the government and people of the Republic of China.”
45
  There was mass 
condemnation of the communiqué throughout Taiwan and many predicted that this would signal 
the abandonment of Taiwan by the United States. 
European countries, mainly the allies of the U.S., showed their support for the 
rapprochement as their citizens echoed the same hope for diplomacy through peace that the 
majority of the American people were calling for at this point.  The most interesting country that 
showed its support for the visit was the communist-led Poland.  In an official communist party 
newspaper, Nixon’s move to improve relations with China was deemed an “overdue reversal” of 
U.S. policy.
46
  The most impressive aspect of Poland’s support is the fact that at this point, they 
were very closely tied to the Soviet Union.  This positive response from a Soviet bloc country 
showed the extent that Nixon’s “political coup” would benefit him in the upcoming election.   
Whether it is the international support from a Soviet-influenced state or the enormous 
out-pouring of approval from the American public, Nixon clearly benefitted from the positive 
view of his trip.  How much credit does Nixon deserve for making this trip happen though?  It is 
a difficult question to answer at any point in history for a president because of the multiple 
factors both with the American system and with other governments abroad.  It is hard to imagine 
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Nixon, the communist combatant, putting much effort into breaking down barriers with a major 
communist country.  Above all else, the timing of the trip was the most influential factor on 
making this trip a reality, and Nixon just happened to be the man in charge when the opportunity 
arose. 
From the close of World War II until the end of the Cultural Revolution, America was 
gripped with the Red Scare.  Senator Joseph McCarthy was leading the crusade to root out 
communists on the home front and internationally, the U.S. was embroiled in conflicts with 
communist countries abroad.  Tensions between China and the U.S. were on the rise, and there 
was no inclination from either country that they wished to improve relations.   
Once Mao brought China out of the isolation of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, 
however, the opportunity became much more plausible, if not only for the Sino-Soviet 
relationship deterioration that China was faced with.  As troops increasingly populated the Sino-
Soviet border as the 1960’s came to a close, China was faced with the possibility of a two-front 
war.  Mao, for obvious reasons, wanted no part in this.
47
  The border clashes that took place 
between these two nations in 1969 was a wake-up call for Mao as to the danger of a major war 
with the Soviet Union.  Fear of war and the possible use of nuclear weapons, acted as the catalyst 
for Mao’s reluctant agreement to begin negotiating a meeting with the U.S.
48
  Mao understood 
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that the appearance of improved relations with the Americans would throw off the balance of 
power in the Pacific and lead to an uneasy and less aggressive Soviet Union.   
The idea of nuclear war itself played a large role in actively seeking improved relations 
on Nixon’s part.  All-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly 
treacherous if only for the arms race that had been raging since the end of World War II.  The 
U.S. hegemony over nuclear arms was short-lived, and the United States’ biggest enemy 
controlling a massive arsenal of nuclear weapons was a threatening proposition for the president.   
In a tape recording concerning the trip to China, Nixon asserted that “getting to know 
each other better will reduce the possibility of miscalculation and that we established, because 
we do have an understanding.”
49
  It was one thing for the U.S. to loosely talk about the use of 
nuclear weapons in the Korean War, when there was little danger of a nuclear attack on the U.S., 
but once China and the Soviets began developing their own weapons of mass destruction, it 
became a much more dangerous possibility.  
After his inauguration in 1969, Nixon understood that the time for a dialogue with the 
PRC was beginning to present itself.  In October the next year, Nixon asked the heads of state of 
Pakistan and Romania to secretly let the Chinese know that he would like to improve relations.
50
  
The timing of this initiation of contact is something to note as it coincides with dipping approval 
ratings of the Vietnam War and Nixon’s approval ratings as a foreign policy maker.  Prior to this 
                                                             
49 Richard Nixon, “Conversation 92-1,” Third Chronological Conversation Tape Release, January 26, 1972. 
50 Kuisong Yang and Xia, Yafeng, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” 403. 
 
 
initiation, Nixon made very little effort during the first year and a half of his presidency to make 
it known that he wanted to work on the relationship with China.   
Where Mao openly confessed to his attempt to pit the U.S. and Soviets against each 
other, Nixon was much more subtle on this front.  Nixon was always looking for an advantage 
against the Soviets and driving home the recent division between the PRC and the USSR seemed 
a great way to do that.  He reiterated through multiple channels that his intentions were not to 
escalate the conflict or damage their relationship, but that was going to be a clear outcome of the 
trip regardless of what anyone said.
51
  The constant reiterations of non-interference indirectly had 
a reverse effect on the American people as they became much more aware of that facet of the 
trip. 
The very idea of dividing the communist powers would also undermine the symbolism 
that Nixon wanted to portray on this trip.  This was supposed to be a trip for a renewed hope for 
peace and open dialogue between two world powers.  Any politically savvy president would 
jump at the chance to divide the communist powers, but they would be wise not to let the public 
in on that notion when it involved a trip like Nixon’s.  Political motivation would have destroyed 
that image, and that simply was not Nixon’s aim.  In short, Nixon’s political motivations led him 
to bury the true political motivations of the trip. 
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Nixon and Kissinger, while playing up the improved relations as a bridge toward peace to 
the public, were much less excited over this element of the trip in private accounts.  Early on in 
the presidency, Kissinger was content with an isolated China as far as U.S. interests go, and saw 
no real reason to attempt rapprochement.
52
  They give off a sense of being chiefly motivated by 
this event being the pinnacle point in the administrations legacy.  This was to be Nixon’s finest 
hour as foreign peacemaker, at least for his first term in office which was coming to an end later 
in the year. 
In Nixon’s defense, the trip was seen as a new beginning toward achieving peace in the 
Pacific region.  American’s were war weary at this point due to the Vietnam War.  This surprise 
announcement by Nixon was heralded as a huge development for world peace between capitalist 
and communist powers, as was seen in the “Harris Analysis” numbers previously mentioned.  
“These results are clear-cut signs that the American people are highly sensitive to foreign policy 
development in 1972 and are thirsting for good news and events which promise peace.”
53
  The 
people were ready for a development like this trip. 
This thirst for hope among the American people, coupled with the timing of the trip in 
regards to the 1972 presidential election could be the biggest indicator as to Nixon’s true 
political motivation.  Nixon’s approval ratings were falling on the eve of 1972.  Nixon’s trip to 
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China was a huge boost in his ratings and it played a big role in his landslide reelection later that 
year.  He won 60% of the popular vote and all but 18 electoral votes.
54
 
If ever there was a perfect storm for the meeting of two enemies, then that storm was 
created in 1969-1972.  Clearly Nixon did not have to do much other than let the Chinese know 
that the U.S. was ready for rapprochement.  He did not even have to say it to the Chinese 
directly, as the back channel talks were successful in grabbing Zhou and Mao’s attention.  Mao 
was finally open to the idea of this trip due to increased tension with the Soviet Union.
55
  It took 
multiple factors beyond simply the president’s willingness to open dialogue with the 
communists. 
Conclusion 
Nixon, ever the politician, showed that much of what made this China trip so important to him 
was the drive for a landmark moment in U.S. foreign relations.  The outlying factors creating a 
compatible landscape for a trip of this magnitude was due to the primary recognition on Nixon’s 
part for making the trip a reality.  Nixon just happened to be the President up for election that 
year who was along for the ride.  Beyond Watergate, Nixon’s trip to China in 1972 did become 
the crowning achievement of his Presidential career, as it paved the way for future politicians to 
build upon the relationship.
56
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To his credit, he did show an extent of compromise—the Taiwan issue—and a 
willingness to get talks underway after decades of silence.  During Kissinger’s secret mission, he 
made assurances to Zhou that the U.S. would soon be pulling support for Taiwan, which was the 
major “sticking point” for China’s agreement to a meeting.
57
  Even with the ways in which 
Nixon pushed the trip toward fruition, it was largely due to other dynamics taking place both 
domestically and internationally. 
In some respects, the course of Nixon’s path toward this trip can be seen as a microcosm 
of his presidency.  While he garnered a majority of domestic support for the trip, he did have his 
opponents.  Some of those opponents even accused Nixon of an abuse of presidential power with 
how he handled the whole process.  As a conservative Democrat, Representative John R. Rarick 
was wholly opposed to Nixon’s trip to China, accusing Nixon of running his “personal 
diplomacy” on the American taxpayers’ dime.  He also accused the president of staging relaxed 
relations early in 1971 in order to help get people on board with the idea of rapprochement with 
China.
58
  He was not entirely wrong with his accusation of relaxed relations, either, as the 
president did promote less restrictive travel regulations and trade in 1971 prior to his 
announcement of the trip.  The “personal diplomacy” was something that Nixon brought upon 
himself with the way that he dealt with foreign policy. 
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Secret missions and an uninformed State Department characterize his presidency as well.  
The State Department did not even know that Kissinger was to visit mainland China in July until 
after Kissinger made his return.
59
  Transparency in government was the last thing Nixon wanted 
to see, let alone transparency within the government.  This was apparent in the methods he used 
in the run-up to the China trip.   
Nixon’s love for total control over a situation was seen throughout the preparation for the 
trip and during the trip itself as well.  In a memo to First Lady Pat Nixon prior to the trip, was a 
list of questions she may possibly be asked by the American and Chinese media and the answers 
she should give.  There is a clear motive in the memo to move the conversation toward how 
important the trip was for opening up dialogue between two countries that have had silence 
between them for so many years.
60
  Whether he was keeping the State Department out of the 
know, or feeding answers to his wife as to the questions she would be asked, Nixon tried to keep 
every detail under his thumb. 
It is common knowledge that Nixon has been accused of abusing Presidential power by 
many Americans.  It is not outlandish to look at his trip to China as an abuse of power, although 
it does not carry with it the same obvious signs that the Watergate scandal did.  With a poor 
economy at the time, Rarick’s accusations of “personal diplomacy” were not just empty words.  
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Nixon and Kissinger’s elaborate scheme to send Kissinger through Pakistan in order to discreetly 
fly to Beijing can be argued to be a misuse of taxpayer dollars.   
Regardless of whether or not it was a misuse of Presidential power, Nixon was motivated 
by political factors in his decision to go through with the historic trip.  It was an event that 
changed the landscape of the international scene, and it altered the power struggle between the 
USSR, U.S. and PRC.  It also helped Nixon close in on his coveted foreign policy title of 
peacekeeper.  No matter how Nixon went about achieving his goal of Chinese rapprochement, it 
is undisputable the impact this visit had on world diplomacy in the 20
th
 century, but it was also 
essential in winning a landslide presidential election in 1972. 
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